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We analyse the effect due of the next FTA between Morocco and the EU on bilateral 
Moroccan imports. As our main contribution to the existing literature, we include in our 
gravity equation tariff data at the industry level. This allows to better estimate trade 
determinants and also makes possible to perform simulations of the tariff dismantling 
taking into account its different path for each industry and year. A complete tariff 
dismantling will double the average yearly trade growth observed in the years just 
before the transition period to the FTA begun. The average effect follows the tariff 
reduction schedule being greater at the beginning and at the end of the transition period. 
The effect is positive for all EU Member States but exports growth to Morocco is 
greater for Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, Lithuania and Spain and lower for Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, France and Sweden. By industries, the faster growth are predicted 
for Leather and leather products, Wood and wood products, Textiles and textile 
products, Rubber and plastic products and Pulp, paper an paper products and publishing 
and printing. Finally, we also find a positive effect of Moroccan immigration in the EU 
on bilateral trade. 
Keywords: liberalisation; EU; Morocco; Free Trade Area; Tariff; Immigration; 
Liberalisation; gravity equation. 
JEL: F13, F14, F17, F22 
                                                 
♣ This paper has benefited financial support from the Centro de Estudios Andaluces (Junta de Andalucia, 
Spain) within the context of the Research Project ECO12-2004. 
1 Departamento de Economía, M. Cuantitativos e Hª Económica Universidad Pablo de Olavide Ctra. de 
Utrera, Km.1 41013 Sevilla Spain e-mail: jvblacri@upo.es Phone: +34 954 34 98 52 Fax: +34 954 34 93 
39 
2 Dpto. de Teoría e Historia Económica. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Universidad 
de Granada. Campus de Cartuja, s/n. 18.011. Granada (Spain). E-mail: jmilgram@ugr.es. Telf.: +34 958 
24 61 92. Fax: +34 958 24 99 95  
2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2000, the EU and Morocco have started a Free Trade Area (FTA) to be in place in 
2012. Until that date, European goods entering the Moroccan market were charged the 
same duties as other OMC member. The agreement implies the progressive dismantling 
of these barriers for industrial goods. Hence, average tariffs will be progressively 
downward from 25,8% in 2000 to 5,2% in 2012.  
Some works measure the impact of this FTA on Moroccan welfare but there is none 
that analyses how EU exports to Morocco could be affected and this study is an attempt 
to fill this gap. Though it is highly probable that this effect will be of great relevance for 
Morocco due to the magnitude of the agreed tariff dismantling. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the EU-Morocco FTA on EU 
Member States’ exports to Morocco. We use a gravity equation to estimate the 
Moroccan demand for imports. Our main contribution to the previous literature is to 
include in the specification disaggregated tariff data. Moreover, this allows us to 
simulate the impact of the trade liberalization and to forecast future trade flows.  We 
also evaluate the effect of Moroccan immigration in the EU on bilateral trade flows 
between both economies. There is a recently and growing literature arguing that 
immigrants have a positive effect on the bilateral trade between immigrants’ host and 
home countries. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the main 
characteristics of the EU-Morocco trade flows and the Moroccan trade liberalization. 
Section 3 presents the empirical model and the methodology used to estimate and 
simulate trade flows. Section 4 presents the econometric and simulations results as well 
as the sensibility analysis. Finally, section 5 summarises the main conclusions. 
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II.  Trade flows and trade liberalization between Morocco and the EU 
 
The Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco signed in 1995 entered 
into force in March 2000. It has relevant economic implications. Even not the only 
aspect, free movement of goods is the more relevant. The agreement signed implies the 
progressive statement of a FTA for industrial goods that will be completed in 2012
3.  
In the framework of the common external trade policy, Morocco has traditionally 
enjoyed better conditions than many others extra-EU partners thanks to a preferential 
agreement. Since 1976, Moroccan industrial goods were granted duty free access to the 
EU market and 20% of its agricultural goods also benefited from a preferential 
treatment. However, most of Moroccan agricultural exports to the EU are limited by 
non-tariff barriers as reference prices, seasonal restrictions and quotas. Until the 
Association Agreement, this preferential treatment was not reciprocal. European goods 
only enjoyed the Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFNC). From then, Morocco has 
agreed to progressively dismantling tariffs on industrial goods imported from the EU 
and to offer a preferential treatment to agricultural products. Hence, the FTA between 
Morocco and the EU supposes for the former a unilateral and relevant trade 
liberalization. The average tariff will be downward from a 25,8% to a 5,2% at the end of 
the transitional period.  
[TABLE 1] 
 
According to the agreement signed, in 2012, 50% of total Moroccan imports will be 
completely free of tariff barriers. In fact, most industrial goods imported from Morocco 
came from the EU while agricultural goods – that will not be affected – came mostly 
from the rest of the world. Considering that industrial and geographical import 
structure, and without considering yet any trade diversion, most Moroccan imports 
coming from the EU will be affected by this agreement (Milgram, 2001). 
 
Moroccan trade policy has been a mixture of progressive liberalization of imports, 
export promotion of industrial goods and strong protection of basic agricultural 
products. During the last years, an effort of transparency has been undertaken. Quotas 
                                                 
3 Negotiations about agricultural goods were delayed.  
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on agricultural goods have been reversed on tariffs and all tariffs have been 
consolidated in the context of GATT. At the same time, simplification of the tariff 
system has resulted in a relevant reduction of the number of tariffs.  
With respect to manufactures, the standard deviation of tariffs was considerably 
reduced during the eighties. However, many differences subsist depending among 
goods and sectors. Consumer goods are the most levied in order to protect national 
producers competing with imports. This kind of goods will be liberalisated slowly, 
trying to delay until the end of the transitional period the impact on national producers. 
Table 1 shows that the sectors with the highest tariffs in 2000 are Textiles and their 
products, Leather and their products, Wood and their products, Pulp, paper and their 
products, publishing and printing, Rubber and plastic products, Other non-metallic 
mineral products and Basic metals and fabricated metal products. However, we haven’t 
taken into account discounts granted to imports on intermediate goods for Moroccan 
firms that export most of its production. Those measures, implemented by the end of the 
eighties in order to promote manufactured goods exports, specially benefit imported 
textile goods subject to outward-processing and machinery imports. 
This trade policy may explain the relevance of EU textile goods exports to Morocco 
(24 % of total exports). The main exporters are France (39.9%), Spain (16.6%), Italy 
(10.4%) and Germany (9.8%); Members States that also are, with the only exception of 
the last, the main promoters of outward-processing  for textile products (Table 2). 
Exports of Electrical and optical equipment are also relevant (25.6%) and represent 
more than 50% of total exports to Morocco for countries as Sweden, Finland, Hungary 
and Denmark. It is also the main export sector to Morocco for Finland and France, very 
close to Textiles for the last. After Textiles and Electrical and optical equipment, the 
next manufacture sector in exports to Morocco are Basic metals and fabricated metal 
products (11.1%), Transport equipment (8.2%), Machinery (7.9%) and Chemical 
products (6.9%). 
Concluding, the EU exports to Morocco concentrate in few products and 75% of 
them come from only 4 Member States. Moreover, while countries as Sweden, Finland, 
Hungary and even a large country as UK concentrate most of its exports on one or two 
sector, other countries like Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Italy present a more diversified 
export structure
4.  
                                                 
4 Nonetheless, all those countries, with the exception of Portugal, concentrates at least 20% of their 




III.  The empirical model 
 
III.1  The gravity model and tariffs 
 
Our empirical model is an augmented gravity equation for trade. The basic 
gravity equation for trade relates positively the volume of trade flow to the mass of 
the two partner countries and negatively to the trade costs between them.  The early 
works of Linnemann (1966) and Leamer y Stern (1970) demonstrate that the gravity 
equation for trade is a convenient empirical model to explain trade flows. Later, 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) established theoretical 
foundations for the gravity equation for trade. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) 
developed a more general gravity model that allows tariff barriers to be non-zero. 
More recently, empirical applications directly derived from theory, as Helpman 
(1987), Hummels and Levinshon (1995), Fontagné, Freudenberg and Péridy (1998) 
and Evenett and Keller (1998), concluded that and eclectic vision of trade 
determinants, which include both the Hecksher-Ohlin and the increasing returns 
trade models, best matches the gravity equation of trade and theoretical models.  
In this work, we quantify the effect of trade policy on bilateral imports. This is 
an innovating application of the gravity equation for methodological issues. A first 
wave of works addressed the effect of regional trade agreements on trade flows by 
including dummy variables into the gravity equation – as Frankel and Wei (1993), 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Sapir (1997) and Rose (2004). However, if 
models are not correctly specificated, parameters on the sensibility of trade flows to 
trade policy can be overestimated when dummy variables are used. More recently, 
more accurate proxies for trade barriers have been included into gravity equations, 
opening a new and promising field of research. Some authors introduced exogenous 
qualitative discrete variables trying to capture the degree of trade policy protection – 
as Castilho (1999), Wall (1999) and Fouquin and Gaulier (2000). Finally, other 
works have included into the specifications tariffs and non-trade barriers, most at 
country level– as Harrigan (1993), Fontagné and Péridy (1995), Haveman et al. 
(1999), Hummels (1999), Castilho (1999), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Milgram 
(2005) and Péridy (2005).  
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III.2  Immigration and international trade 
 
Recently, many works have found empirical evidence on a positive link between 
immigration and bilateral trade between immigrants host and home country. For 
example, Gould (1994) and Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) for the USA, Head and 
Ries (1998) and Wagner et al. (2002) for Canada, Girma and Yu (2002) for the UK, 
Rauch and Trindade (2002) for a set of countries with Chinese immigrants and 
Blanes (2005, 2006) and Blanes and Martin-Montaner (2006) for Spain. This link 
appears robust to many samples, specification and estimation methods. 
  Immigration can influence trade flows through two basic channels. First, 
immigrants bring with them a preference for home-country products. That can 
contribute to increase imports demand from the host-country. Second, immigration 
can reduce trading transaction costs. According to Wagner et al. (2002), we call the 
first channel the preference hypothesis and the second one the information 
hypothesis. This second channel is twofold. In one hand, immigration can create 
ethnic networks – knowledge of home-country markets and business contacts 
(Rauch, 1999). Immigrants can have an advantage in dealing with their countrymen 
who remain at the home country due to issues of trust or of mutually understood 
culture. Rauch and Trindade (2002) showed that Chinese immigrants help to match 
buyers and sellers and deter violations of contracts by providing community 
enforcement of sanctions.  In the other hand, cultural ties, as common language, 
historical colonial ties, common preferences, knowledge of political and social 
institutions, can reduce trading transaction costs. When those characteristics are not 
well known, immigrants can contribute to increase mutual knowledge, facilitating 
trade flows. Moreover, immigrants can reduce trade transaction costs by their 
knowledge about the products and their characteristics produced in both countries. 
  The existing literature suggests that the relevance of these two channels would 
be different for different types of trade flows and immigrant individual and national 
characteristics. Those differences help in identifying the mechanisms explaining the 
link between immigration and trade. 
  Finally, Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) pointed out a trade-substitution 
immigration effect. Immigrants can apply their knowledge about technology or 
production methods and about immigrants’ tastes to host-country production or  
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transmit them to local producers in a way that previously imported goods could be 
substituted by local production. However, this is a negative effect on imports that is 
not to be considered in our work since we analyse only exports flows. 
  Most of the literature on immigration and trade uses a gravity equation of trade. 
To the basic specification, they add a variable that measures the number on 
immigrants living in the analysed country and other control variables.  If we take 
into account that Morocco is a relevant source of immigrants in many EU Member 
States, we can forecast a positive effect of such immigration on the bilateral trade 
between Morocco and the EU.  
 
III.3 Estimation  methodology 
 
  The gravity equation for trade stands as: 
 
3 2 1 α α α
ij j i ij TB Y Y TV =       ( 1 )  
 
Where TV represents the volume of the trade flow, Y the size of the country, TB the 
trade barriers and i and j the partner countries. This equation is usually expressed in 
logarithms so it can be estimated but Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
  A handful of variables approaching country size and trade barriers are used 
depending on each case and on data availability.  The GDP is the most used proxy to 
country size although country population is also often used as a measure of country 
purchasing power. Trade barriers are more difficult to proxy. The reason is that there are 
many factors that can promote or difficult trade flows and frequently there is also a lack 
of appropriate data to measure such factors. Many papers proxy transaction costs simply 
by means of the geographical distance between both countries. However, it is more 
usual to include simultaneously into the specification to be estimate a set of variables. 
For example, many papers include a dummy variable for countries sharing a frontier. 
Recently, some papers include dummy variables that proxy the existence of historical o 
cultural ties between countries, such as a colonial past o the use of a common language. 
More recently, even, a few papers include a variable that measures immigrant 
population or some of its characteristics such as skills, education or length of living in 
the host-country. Trade and non-trade barriers are difficult to include into the model  
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because they are not easily available or even they are not available at all. Most papers 
make use of dummy variables, as the fact of two countries of being members of the 
same economic integration process, o qualitative discrete variables. A scarce number of 
papers, including  this work, include  tariff data at a disaggregated level. 
  In this work we analyse the Moroccan imports (M) demand from 17 EU 
members
5 (i) disaggregated for 15 industries according to the NACEa31 nomenclature 
and 4 years (t). The period analyses is 1999 to 2002 in order to cover a longer period 
that includes 1999, one before the beginning of the dismantling. We estimate the 
following empirical model in logarithms by OLS for several specifications explained in 
the next sections: 
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where VA is the Value Added in constant prices of each exporter at the industry level as 
a proxy of supply, GDP is the Moroccan Gross Domestic Product in constant prices is 
introduced to control for Moroccan demand, dist is the geographical distance, IMM is 
the number of Moroccan immigrants in each EU Estate Member and tariff is the 
Moroccan tariff on each industry. 
  Industry trade data for each EU member are from the CHELEM-CEPII database. 
Figures are expressed in real terms using Moroccan import price indexes from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank). The Value Added is taken from Eurostat. 
The distance between each Member Estate of the EU and Morocco, measured as the 
distance between capital cities comes from the CEPII database. Immigration data are 
from de Population Census 2001 (Eurostat) and correspond to the EU 15
6. Moroccan 
tariffs applied to EU imports are taken from TRAINS (UNCTAD) for the year 2001 at 
the HS6
7 level of disaggregation and we have aggregated them for each industry 
considered. Tariffs for the rest of the transitional period to the FTA, have been 
                                                 
5 Due to data availability we really consider EU Estate Members exports to Morocco. The EU countries 
considered are Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Check Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
6 We extrapolate 2001 data to the whole sample period. 
7 Harmonised System at 6 digits level of aggregation.  
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computed according to the dismantling schedule agreed between Morocco and the EU, 
being the year 2001 the second year of the transition period. 
  Usually, dummy variables for industry effects are included into exports 
equations as an – imperfect- proxy to the industry exports supply when data on industry 
output is not available. Since our specification includes industry output for each 
industry in each EU country,, we expect these dummy variables to capture other 
additional specific effects either of the Moroccan demand or of the EU supply. Given 
that EU exports to Morocco are concentrated at the industry level, in some 
specifications we have only included dummy variables for industries with a clear 
differentiated behaviour, as Textiles and Electric equipment. We have also included 
dummy variables for each EU Estate Member, dropping the distance variable to avoid 
collinearity.  More over, we have included a dummy variable that is equal to one for 
those countries whose official or co official language is French and zero otherwise 
(comlang-off). Sharing a common language usually appears to promote bilateral trade 
relations. It also allows us to check the robustness of the positive effect of immigration 
on trade flows. We can thus identify if immigrants brings with them additional 
knowledge about their host and home countries institutions that reduces trade 
transaction costs or if this positive effect is due only to the fact of sharing the same 
language or having a common colonial past resulting in similar institutions in both 
countries, facts that are independent of the presence of immigrants
8. Last, as we have a 
pool of data, we include a yearly dummy variable to control for any other time specific 
effect.  
 
IV.  Econometric results 
 
IV.1.  Determinants of EU exports to Morocco 
 
We have estimated 12 specifications of equation (2) numbered as 1 to 12 for the 
1999-2002 period including immigration data (Table 3A) and without them (Table 3B) 
because this variable is available only for the former 15 members of the EU. Models are 
                                                 
8 Another variable we have considered to include in the model is a dummy capturing historical o colonial 
ties between Morocco and EU Estate Members. However, this variable and the language variable have a 
high correlation coefficient and hence both may be capturing the same effects.  
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estimated by OLS
9. According to the coefficient of determination, which ranges 
between 0.73 and 0.84, the model adjusts quite well on all specifications. 
Regarding to the variables usually included in the basic gravity equation, we first 
observe that the EU Member States industry output have in all specifications the 
expected positive effect on exports. The Moroccan demand size, proxy by its GDP, 
appears to be not significant. However, when we include instead the value added by 
industry, supposed to be substitute a imports, results show a positive and significant 
effect. This surprising result probably reflects the fact that there must be a structural 
imports flow in Morocco complementary of the domestic production in a way that this 
flow is not negatively affected by the domestic output growth (as in Machinery and 
Textiles) but on the opposite is stimulated by the mean of inputs and equipment goods 
imports for instance. 
Transport costs, measured by distance between countries, appear to be significant 
barriers for trade between the EU and Morocco. In all the specifications, distance 
presents a significant and negative coefficient greater than one, the figure usually 
obtained for bilateral trade flows. Hence, countries like Spain have a clear advantage of 
localization with respect to other EU members since it is geographically closer to 
Morocco than the later. 
Turning now to the main concern of this paper, , Moroccan tariffs (at the industry 
level) have a relevant negative effect on EU imports. This result is robust since it stands 
for 19 out of 24 different specifications
10. According to our results, the average 
coefficient for the 10 estimated specifications without the immigration variable for the 
1992-2002 period is -3.39899. The average tariff on manufactures was in 2000 a 
30.84%. A complete dismantling of tariffs will increase Moroccan imports from the EU 
by a 2.4934 – (1+0.3084)
3.39899, that is to say, an increase of 149%. So, we can expect 
that the next progressive dismantling of Moroccan tariffs on EU imports down to zero 
in many industries is going to cause a relevant increase of EU exports to Morocco.     
[TABLE 3A and 3B] 
                                                 
9 We have also use panel data estimators. Results are similar to the ones from OLS estimator regarding to 
the sensibility of exports to tariffs. However, the coefficients of determination from panel data estimators 
are lower than from OLS but don’t differ substantially. Panel data estimations are not presented to save 
space but are available from the authors upon request. 
10 The only exceptions are specifications 8, 11 and 12 and 7b and 8b when the immigration variable is 
included or not, respectively. These results can be explained by the presence of industry dummies that 
capture all differences among industries, as different figures for tariffs. Thus, when we also include 
country fixed effects the coefficient for the tariff variable is again significant and negative.   
11 
Regarding the impact of Moroccan immigration, we find in all specifications a 
positive effect on EU exports to Morocco except when country dummies are included–
specification 9 to 12. The variable comlang_off, which has a positive effect on EU 
exports, slightly reduces the coefficient of the immigration variables but does not 
eliminate its positive effect. That is to say, the variable that measures the presence of 
Moroccan immigration in the EU Members States enhances trade even when variables 
as common language or a colonial past with some EU countries are controlled for. 
Hence, immigrant population promotes EU exports to Morocco and thus can help EU 
firms in entering the Moroccan market. This result is even more relevant if we consider 
recent research, as Péridy (2006), that estimates that there is still a significant migration 
potential from Maghreb countries towards Southern European Countries. As explained 
in the previous section, apart from the preference effect – that only affects imports from 
the immigrants’ home country – immigration reduces trade transaction costs by means 
of immigrants’ knowledge about products and economic and social institutions as well 
as by their capability to settle ethnic networks between the EU Estate Members and 
Morocco. However, to identify the mechanisms behind the link between immigration 
and trade is beyond the scope and the data availability of this paper. 
 
 
IV.2.  Simulations of the tariff dismantling 
 
Departing from the estimated coefficients, it is possible to perform a simulation of 
the impact of the tariff dismantling on Moroccan imports from the EU either for each 
country or industry. This allows us to complete the analysis of the previous section by a 
deeper study of the tariff dismantling as agreed by the EU and Morocco. We have 
estimated the model for a period of four years to guarantee more robust results than 
those obtained from a cross section analysis. The resulting coefficients reflect the 
average sensibility of exports to each explanatory variable. However, we have to take 
into account that this dismantling begun in 2000 and this must be the reference year. 
Also, the tariff dismantling is going to last until 2012, it does not affect equally all 
industries and it is not equally distributed along the transitional period. 





irt tariff OTHERS b M ε α + + + ∗ = ) 1 ln( ) ln( 5    (3)  
12 
were OTHERS refers to the explanatory variables matrix, with the exception of the 
tariff variable. This matrix includes different sets of variables depending on the 
specification considered (1b to 12b)
 11. 
  First, we estimate the potential volume of Morocco’s imports from the EU, that 
is the one predicted by the estimated model (without the error term): 




irt tariff OTHERS b predict M + + ∗ = α  (4) 
  With no tariff, the volume of imports would be the one predicted by the other 
variables into the model (tariff takes a value equal to zero). Using the coefficients from 
the estimation of the equation (3), we can predict the volume of imports in case of a 
total liberalization (tariff equal to zero). For each EU country i and industry r: 
5 ) 1 ( * _
)) 1 ln( exp(
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  Though, the liberalization agreed will not be total what means that the final tariff 
– t2012 –will not  be settle at zero in all production sectors. We have computed the tariff 
for each industry r and year t’ along the period 2002-2012, as described by the 
Association Agreement. This allows us to simulate the real dismantling. The volume of 
Moroccan imports from the EU will be the one predicted by the rest of explanatory 
variables in the model at the started year of the transitional period (OTHERSir2000) and 
the computed tariff for the year t’ (tariffrt’). So, the simulate imports for the year t’ can 
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IV.3. Sensibility  analysis 
 
                                                 
11 In order to the simulations to include information about the maximum number of EU Members, we 
have use results from the specifications that do not include the immigration variable: 
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The simulations have to be performed on the basis of one of the specifications 
presented above. In order to obtain robust simulations, we have to test for the sensibility 
of estimated results to the different specifications we have estimated. Results for this 
sensibility analysis are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 for the whole EU, by countries 
and by industries, respectively. Tables show the average and the standard deviations of 
two indicators: percentage of the actual imports in year 2000 explained by the model 
omitting the error term (M_predictEU,total,2000/M_EU,total,2000), and the predicted increase – 
in percentage- of imports in the case of a total trade liberalization ((M_libtotalEU,total -
1)/M_predictEU,total,2000). The number of observations – 10 - corresponds to the number 
of specifications considered as we have excluded from this sensibility analysis 
specifications 7b and 8b for the reasons explained before. 
For the whole of EU exports to Morocco, the model explains a 95% of them, as 
average of all specifications. This percentage varies between 73 and 118% among 
specifications. A total liberalization of Moroccan imports from the EU will increase 
them in a 117%, ceteris paribus. Considering that the transitional dismantling period 
will last for 12 years, the average yearly effect will be of 9.77%. Just before the 
liberalization process beginning (1996 to 2000), EU exports to Morocco were quite 
dynamic with an annual average growth rate of 8.2%
12. Our estimations conclude that if 
this tendency – not due to trade liberalization – will continue, the annual average 
increase of EU exports to Morocco during the transitional period will rise from 8.2% to 
18%.  
[TABLE 4] 
  However, some considerations should be add to this result. First, as said before, 
the tariff dismantling is not going to be total for all sectors. Second, it is not equally 
distributed along the transitional period and the big impact should be delayed until the 
end of the period. This is why we have o perform the simulation exercise in the next 
section. 
  The results by EU Member States for the sensibility analysis are presented in 
Table 5. In 14 out of 17 countries, the average of the real volume of imports in year 
2000 explained by the model is superior to 50% and the standard deviation is below 50. 
By country, the model overestimates the exports to Morocco of Austria, Germany and 
Portugal and underestimates exports from Sweden, Greece and Finland. The effect of 
                                                 
12 We have to notice that this increase of Moroccan imports has been conditioned by the strong 
appreciation of the Dirham along this period.   
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Morocco setting tariffs to zero will affect positively exports from each EU Member 
State. However, this effect will be of a different magnitude. Hence, Lithuania, Greece 
and Portugal and Finland and Germany are the countries that will increase their exports 
the greater and the lesser, respectively. Spain is the forth country in a decreasing 
ranking, and its exports to Morocco will increase a 131% for the whole transitional 
period. 
[TABLE 5] 
  Finally, results by industry are presented in Table 6. In this case, the variance of 
the results obtained by the different specifications is greater than by country or by the 
whole EU and industries. However, the estimated trade flows are closer to the real ones 
than in the by country case. Comparing the different industries, the average of the share 
of real imports explained by the model varies between 30.8% (Textiles) and 237.9% 
(Other non-metallic minerals products) and the average for all industries is of 123.3%. 
The standard deviation remains bellow 30. These results indicate that additional 
variables should be included to better forecast Morocan imports by industries.  For 
example, the poor results obtained for the Textiles industry may be explained by the fact 
that Morocco applies relevant tariff reduction for those products when they enter the 
country for outward-processing.   
[TABLE 6] 
 
IV.4. Analysis  of  the tariff dismantling 
 
As explained before, results obtained in our estimation analysis correspond to 
hypothetical total trade liberalization. It is most closer to the real liberalization process 
recently started by Morocco and the EU to take into account that the tariff dismantling 
is not going to be total for all sector and will be gradual during the established 
transitional period.  
To perform this simulation, we first have chosen one of the estimated specifications, 
considering the previous sensibility analysis. We discard specifications 7b and 8b 
because the resulting coefficient for the tariff variable was not significant. In 
specifications 11b and 12b, even the parameter for tariff is significant, the level of 
significance is sensibly lower than obtained in other specifications. Among the rest of 
specifications, we chose the 4b because it presents the closest parameter (-3.395) to the  
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average (-3.39899). The results for the simulation exercise are presented in Tables 7, 8 
and 9. 
[TABLE 7] 
The annual average impact for all industries and countries exports to Morocco due 
to the FTA follows the path of the tariff dismantling. So, it is bigger at the beginning 
and at the last year of the transitional period. We predict an 8.2% average annual 
increase in EU exports to Morocco for the 2000-2012 period. It is similar to the exports 
growth observed during the period 1996-2000. Hence, our results show that the FTA 
wills double the rate growth of the Moroccan imports from the EU. 
[TABLE 8] 
Regarding the impact of tariff dismantling by industry (Table 8), Leather and leather 
products, Wood and wood products, Textiles and textiles products, Rubber and plastic 
products and Pulp, paper and paper products and publishing and printing are the ones 
that will achieve a higher exports’ increase. However, it should not be forget that even if 
imports duties on Textiles industry are high, most intermediate goods as textile fabrics 
can be imported into Morocco free of tariffs. Unfortunately, data needed to evaluate this 
different tariff treatment are not available. Hence, only finished textiles products 
imports are charged by high tariffs what may explain why our model overestimate the 
trade creation of the FTA in this industry. 
Comparing with the observed trade rate growth during the first two years of the 
beginning of the FTA, the industries that present the higher increases are the same than 
predicted by our model. This confirms the strong exports growth potential as 
emphasized in the previous section, since the actual level of EU exports to Morocco is 
low, compared with the predicted by the explanatory variables included in our 
econometrical analysis. 
[TABLE 9] 
By countries, our simulation predicts a faster export growth than the EU average for 
Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, Lithuania, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Austria and slower for 
Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France and Sweden, UK and Netherlands. The 
Czech Republic is at the EU average. Compared with the observed trade growth during 
the period 1996-2001, some differences arise. The most remarkable one is that during 
the years before the FTA transitional period beginning and in the first two years, three 
out of the four new EU Estate Members – Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary - in our 
sample as well as some Scandinavian countries as Denmark and Sweden were the ones  
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that presented higher trade growth figures. Those countries were the ones with started 
from lower shares on total EU exports to Morocco. Moreover, as seen in Table 2, those 
countries do not concentrate their exports on the sector that will be more dynamics 
during the transition period. So, its seems that, after a period of convergence of the 
countries with the small trade relations with Morocco, trade growth rate will set at a 
structural level. Nonetheless, this predicted exports growth rate, although clearly lower 
than in the years before, will continue to stay among the EU Estate Members highest 
ones in the case of Slovakia and Lithuania but not for Hungary, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have analysed the determinants of EU countries’ exports to 
Morocco at and industry level using data for the period 1999-2002. We focus on the 
impact of Moroccan tariffs on its exports in order to evaluate how the FTA between 
Morocco and the EU can affect Moroccan imports from the EU. We also focus on the 
effect of Moroccan immigration into the EU on European exports to Morocco. 
Concerning tariffs, they have, as expected, a negative effect on trade. This result is 
robust to different specifications. The estimated impact is also relevant. A total tariff 
dismantling will increase Moroccan imports from the EU at an annual average rate of 
8.25%. This will double, ceteris paribus, the growth rate reached by EU exports in last 
years, before the agreement entered into force.  
Regarding to Moroccan immigration in the EU, our results show that it contributes 
to increase EU exports to Morocco. This result is robust to different specification not 
including country fixed effects. Moreover, this positive effect on exports prevails when 
a variable capturing cultural and historical links – common language – is included into 
the model. So, immigrants help in reducing trade transaction costs well by the creation 
of ethnic networks or by the bigger amount of information they pose about Moroccan 
and EU institutions and products than, respectively, EU and Moroccan natives residents 
in their home countries. 
Departing from the estimation of EU member States exports to Morocco, and after 
performing a sensibility analysis to different specifications, we perform a simulation 
exercise for the effect of the Moroccan tariff dismantling on its imports from the EU 
both by industries and by Member States.   
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The effect will be positive for the whole EU. It will be greater for Portugal, Greece, 
Slovakia, Lithuania and Spain. By industries, trade will grow faster for Leather and 
their products, Wood and their products, Textiles and textile products, Rubber and 
plastic products and Pulp, paper and paper products and publishing and printing. 
Including tariff data at the industry level in a gravity model remarkably improves 
the fit of estimations and forecasts of trade flows. This is due to the fact that dummy 
variables usually included in other papers capture simultaneously other characteristics 
different from prices that affect trade flows. The model usually fit well with the data 
except for some countries and sectors. FDI or better measures for transport costs, 
competition with other emergent countries are variables that could be also taken into 
account in order to improve the results. With respect to immigration, the availability of 
a database that identifies some individual immigrants characteristics, as educational 
level, skills or length of stay, will allow to analyse the mechanisms behind the positive 
link between immigration and trade.  
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Table 1: Moroccan tariffs on EU imports during the transition period (%) 
 
Moroccan  Tariff  2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Leather and leather products  42.74 42.61 42.48 33.88 25.41 16.94  8.47  0 
Wood and wood products  41.65 41.32 41  32.54 24.41 16.27  8.14  0 
Chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres 
22.23 18.34 14.45 8.45 6.34 4.23 2.11  0 
Rubber and plastic products  39.52 39.14 38.76 30.76 23.14 15.52 7.9  0.28 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
34.53 31.23 27.94 19.72 14.79 9.86 4.93  0 
Machinery and equipment 
n,e,c, 
8.06  7.43 6.8 4.93 3.7 2.46  1.23  0 
Manufacturing  n,e,c,  32.84 22.54 12.25 1.57 1.17 0.78 0.39  0 
Food products; beverages and 
tobacco 
44.24 43.66 43.08 41.09 39.68 38.27 36.86 35.45
Textiles and textile products  39.16 38.55 37.94 29.87 22.4  14.93  7.47  0 
Pulp, paper and paper products; 
publishing and printing 
35.26 34.02 32.78 25.23 18.93 12.62 6.31  0 
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 
26.81 22.94 19.07 12.16 9.12 6.08 3.04  0 
Transport  equipment  17.92 14.5  11.07 6.12 4.59 3.06 1.53  0 
Electrical and optical 
equipment 
10.24 8.25  6.25 3.4 2.55 1.7 0.85  0 




Table 2: EU exports to Morocco (2000) by Member Estate and Industry (% in total) 





























































Austria  0.3%  0.6%  0.6% 0.2% 10.5% 4.8% 0.1% 9.8%  0.1% 38.6% 6.7% 10.8% 1.9% 15.3%  100  % 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
3.6% 2.3%  0.1%  0.3%  11.5%  10.1%  1.8%  6.0%  8.2% 25.2% 2.8% 17.3% 6.9%  7.4%  100  % 
Czech 
Republic 
0.2%  0.5%  1.4% 0.2%  0.4%  1.8% 4.9%  7.9% 2.4%  12.7%  16.1%  34.6%  12.8%  4.3%  100  % 
Denmark  0.4%  0.1%  0.0% 2.1% 15.1% 0.6% 0.3% 5.4% 4.1% 4.1% 0.4% 8.4% 5.6% 53.8%  100  % 
Finland  0.9%  0.0%  0.0% 0.1%  0.2%  0.1% 0.0% 7.6% 5.1% 0.2%  13.6% 1.8% 0.1% 71.3%  100  % 
France  39.9%  1.8%  2.2% 0.7%  7.4%  2.8% 0.7%  6.3%  2.0% 19.1% 2.8% 12.2% 6.5% 35.5%  100  % 
Germany  9.8%  2.2%  0.9% 0.2%  6.6%  6.3% 0.8% 10.1% 2.5% 17.9% 2.0%  8.2% 19.7% 22.6%  100  % 
Greece 0.7%  0.1%  0.1%  0.0%  3.7% 1.6%  3.0% 9.9% 2.3% 16.2% 0.6%  7.3% 50.3% 4.7%  100  % 
Hungary  0.1%  1.1%  2.1% 0.0% 11.3% 1.6% 0.4% 2.8% 0.7%  10.8%  0.0% 5.7% 1.1% 62.4%  100  % 
Italy  10.4%  0.9%  4.2% 1.9%  4.2%  4.7% 2.1% 20.1% 1.7% 23.4% 1.8% 14.1% 6.2% 14.6%  100  % 
Lithuania  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 36.2%  2.9%  14.5%  44.9% 0.0% 1.4%  100  % 
Netherlands  3.4%  1.0%  0.4% 0.2% 11.3% 4.9% 0.1% 4.8% 24.4%  19.3%  1.5% 6.0% 10.6%  15.6%  100  % 
Portugal 1.6% 4.0%  1.7%  0.9%  8.6%  14.6%  1.3% 6.6% 9.9%  14.9%  3.8% 16.3%  12.7% 4.5%  100  % 
Slovakia  0.0%  1.0%  0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 1.3% 0.3% 20.9% 0.0% 8.7% 2.3% 49.5% 1.3%  2.3%  100  % 
Spain  16.6%  1.7%  1.6% 2.6%  8.4%  6.7% 2.5%  6.4%  4.3% 28.2% 3.7% 14.2% 7.1% 12.6%  100  % 
Sweden  3.3%  0.2%  0.0% 0.1%  0.2%  0.4% 0.1% 1.9% 0.3% 0.1%  10.1% 2.0% 8.0% 76.8%  100  % 
United 
Kingdom 
8.9%  1.1%  0.2% 0.2%  3.7%  2.1% 0.2%  6.1% 2.9%  61.5%  1.1% 2.8% 3.9%  14.3%  100  % 
Total    100.0%  1.6%  1.7% 1.0%  6.9%  4.3% 1.1% 7.9%  3.6% 24.0% 2.9% 11.1% 8.2% 25.6%  100  % 
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Table 3A: Determinants of EU exports to Morocco (Pool 1999-2002) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
0.843*** 0.898*** 0.892*** 0.799*** 0.996*** 0.998*** 0.778*** 0.859*** 0.963*** 0.791*** 0.964*** 0.963***  ln(VAB
EU,Industry) 
[0.043] [0.045] [0.045] [0.048] [0.046] [0.053] [0.044] [0.049] [0.058] [0.073] [0.097] [0.097] 
     0.254***  0.153***   0.472   0.264***   0.467  ln(VAB
MOR,Industry) 
     [0.049]  [0.046]  [0.567]  [0.057]  [0.555] 
   -1.500            ln(PIB
MOR) 
   [1.233]           
-1.549*** -1.576*** -1.574*** -1.587*** -1.522*** -1.560*** -1.560*** -1.582*** -1.679*** -1.588*** -1.703*** -1.699***  ln(distance
EU) 
[0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.089] [0.089] [0.073] [0.073] [0.170] [0.167] [0.136] [0.136] 
-4.355*** -4.147*** -4.328*** -4.979*** -4.613*** -4.917***  -1.879* -1.576  -3.986***  -5.113***  -1.659  -1.562  ln(1+tariff
EU,Industry) 
[0.476] [0.477] [0.498] [0.471] [0.523] [0.518] [0.980] [0.971] [0.487] [0.516] [1.091] [1.094] 
0.280*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.250*** 0.235*** 0.184*** 0.298*** 0.229***  -0.227  -0.345 -0.008 -0.038  ln(nb of immigrants 
from Morocco
EU)  [0.020] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.019] [0.025] [0.018] [0.022] [0.259] [0.260] [0.199] [0.205] 
 0.869***  0.870***  0.790***  0.941***  0.838***  5.570***   2.981*  comlang_off 
 [0.135]  [0.135]  [0.136]  [0.119]  [0.101]  [1.949]  [1.519] 
     0.239  0.272         Transport 
     [0.197]  [0.202]        
     1.447***  1.433***         Textiles, leather and clothes  
     [0.161]  [0.156]        
     0.690***  0.623***         Elec 
     [0.169]  [0.167]        
5.978***  5.768***  31.780  1.061 3.675*** 0.630 5.146*** -6.341 8.110***  4.529**  5.276*** -5.360  Constant 
[0.872]  [0.873] [21.350] [1.331]  [0.930]  [1.302]  [0.760] [13.156] [2.025]  [2.202]  [1.775] [12.727] 
              
Country  effect           X  X  X  X 
Sector  effect         X  X     X  X 
Observations  741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 
R
2  0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.84 0.84 
OLS. Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 3B: Determinants of EU exports to Morocco (Pool 1999-2002) Without immigrants. 
  1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b 8b 9b  10b  11b  12b 
1.272*** 1.203*** 1.202*** 1.182*** 1.374*** 1.297*** 1.352*** 1.269*** 0.970*** 0.790*** 0.909*** 0.908***  ln(VAB
EU,Industry) 
[0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.056] [0.071] [0.097] [0.097] 
      0.107**   0.035  0.502   0.269***   0.529  ln(VAB
MOR,Industry) 
     [0.049]  [0.044]  [0.583]  [0.055]  [0.523] 
   -0.626            ln(PIB
MOR) 
   [1.230]           
-1.742*** -1.723*** -1.723*** -1.740*** -1.668*** -1.659*** -1.703*** -1.697*** -1.707*** -1.626*** -1.679*** -1.679***  ln(distance
EU) 
[0.093] [0.090] [0.090] [0.091] [0.094] [0.092] [0.081] [0.078] [0.167] [0.164] [0.133] [0.132] 
-2.873*** -3.115*** -3.189*** -3.395*** -4.136*** -4.366***  -1.626 -1.526  -3.920***  -5.057***  -2.055**  -1.883*  ln(1+tariff
EU,Industry) 
[0.507] [0.480] [0.503] [0.483] [0.563] [0.532] [1.142] [1.049] [0.460] [0.493] [0.946] [0.960] 
             ln(nb of immigrants 
from Morocco
EU)              
 1.659***  1.660***  1.679***  1.578***  1.614***  3.026***  2.805***  comlang_off 
 [0.112]  [0.112]  [0.113]  [0.085]  [0.077]  [0.256]  [0.232] 
     0.098  0.107         transport 
     [0.225]  [0.221]        
     1.824***  1.732***         Textiles, leather and clothes  
     [0.161]  [0.148]        
     0.448**  0.441***         Elec 
3.168***  3.890***  14.731  1.784 1.097 1.191 0.476  -10.189  6.775*** 2.526 5.947*** -6.290 
[0.952] [0.910]  [21.296]  [1.403] [0.960] [1.322] [0.853] [13.520] [1.356]  [1.641]  [1.346] [12.206]  Constant 
            
           X  X  X  X 
Country  effect         X  X     X  X 
Sector  effect  832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 
Observations  0.70 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.85 0.85 
R
2  0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.84 0.84 
OLS. Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 4: Impact of average dismantling for the different specifications (Total EU and industries). 
Variable Obs. 
(nº of models where tariffs variable is significant)
Mean Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
M_predictEU,total,2000/M_EU,total,2000  10  95.56472   13.58766   73.50735    4 117.889 
(M_libtotalEU,total -1)/M_predictEU,total,2000 10  117.2352   52.04721   50.26742     223.015 




Table 5: Impact of average dismantling for the different specifications by EU 
Member Estate (all industries). 
  M_predictME,total,2000/M_ME,total,2000 (M_libtotalME,total -1)/ 
M_predictME,total,2000 
 
UE  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Freq. 
Austria  151.86 49.27  111.81  49.7  10 
Belgium  104.42 40.73  122.25  53.6  10 
Czech  89.79 12.73  119.34  53.25  10 
Denmark  61.88 6.56  111.38  50.24  10 
Finland  23.85 6.74  91.94  40.03  10 
France  90.69 33.17  114.56  50.41  10 
Germany  149.23 44.52  92.86  41.61  10 
Greece  19.46 6.07  174.62  80.55  10 
Hungary  100.9 34.21  106.94  47.61  10 
Italy  97.27 29.55  126.48  58.44  10 
Lithuania  53.57 13.36  190.46  87.61  10 
Netherlands  57.38 33.35  125.27  55.34  10 
Portugal  156.44 47.79  170.33  78.48  10 
Slovakia  68.73 7.35  110.49  46.82  10 
Spain  104.38 27.52  131.47  58.66  10 
Sweden  16.77 2.06  100.61  44.06  10 
UK  81.98 29.07  114.53  50.27  10 
Total  84.03 50.68  124.43  61  170 
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Table 6: Impact of average dismantling for the different specifications by industry (Whole EU). 
  Tariff M_predictEU,Industry,2000/M_EU,Industry,2000 (M_libtotalEU,Industry -1)/
M_predictEU,Industry,2000 
 
NACE A31  2000  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Freq.
Leather and leather products  42.74  42.72  23.61  254.7  126.15  10 
Wood and wood products  41.65  81.09  26.95  244.69  119.93  10 
Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres  22.23  149.21  26.44  101.45  40.42  10 
Rubber and plastic products  39.52 63.86  30.14  225.96  108.5  10 
Other non-metallic mineral products 34.53  237.94  95.29  185.03  84.48  10 
Machinery and equipment n,e,c,  8.06  155.21  18.82  30.51  10.12  10 
Manufactures N.E.C  32.84  130.28  39.31  172.15  77.22  10 
Food products; beverages and tobacco 44.24  192.60  41.59  268.77  135.01  10 
Textiles and textile products  39.16  30.86  23.59  222.82  106.6  10 
Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 35.26  181.34  24.96  190.76  87.76  10 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 26.81  122.22  43.06  129.92  54.58  10 
Transport equipment  17.92  140.72  12.81  77.25  29.2  10 
Electrical and optical equipment  10.24  75.06  18.49  39.89  13.64  10 
Total 30.14  123.32  70.03  164.92  114.27  130 
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Table 7: Average impact on the EU from the Moroccan dismantling 
(% Exports growth). 
Model 4 
(α5 = -3.395292) 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012  Annual 
growth rate  
(2000-2012) 
Change in exports  
















Tariff 30.14  25.39 18.96 14.9  10.85 6.8  2.75   
Annual growth rate  
(1996-2000) 
8.2           
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Table 8: Impact by industry from the Moroccan tariff dismantling  (% exports growth). 
 




Leather and leather products  20.9  0.63  24.33 55.21  96.8 154.03 234.78 21.34  5.48 
Wood and wood products  85.27  1.57  25.3  55.37  95.47  150.06 226.12 20.56  14.84 
Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres  167.68  25  50.08 60.45 71.77 84.14 97.69  8.88  6.64 
Rubber and plastic products  52.07  1.87  24.63 52.82 89.84  139.34 206.91 18.81  5.21 
Other non-metallic mineral products  289.84  18.58 48.58 71.38 98.92  132.48 173.73 15.79  8.01 
Machinery and equipment n,e,c,  129.38  4.09  10.51  15.03  19.8  24.82  30.12  2.74  3.95 
Manufacturing n,e,c,  136.34  77.13 148.76  152.04 155.38 158.78 162.23 14.75  9.76 
Food products; beverages and tobacco  255.53  2.78  7.79  11.53 15.44 19.53 23.81  2.16  8.89 
Textiles and textile products  13.19  3.03  26.44  54.6  91.43  140.47 207.07 18.82  8.55 
Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing  and  printing 202.3  6.48 29.88 54.79 86.26  126.53 178.83 16.26  4.87 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  111.3  23.85 51.73 66.56 83.32  102.34 123.99 11.27  8.17 
Transport  equipment  139.98  22.51 43.02 50.25 57.97  66.2  74.99  6.82  10.14 
Electrical and optical equipment  62.35  13.35 24.3  27.83  31.5  35.3  39.25  3.57  14.81 
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Table 9: Impact by EU Member Estate from the Moroccan tariff dismantling  (% exports growth). 
 
Country  c_vxest 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010  2012 crecimiento  2000-2012 crecimiento  96-01
Austria 169.74  15.58 35.04 45.87 58.66 74.02 92.84  8.44  12.59 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg 128.66 17.12 37.64 48.9 62.01 77.46 96.02  8.73  5.07 
Czech Republic  96.52  15.49 34.51 45.16 57.64 72.49 90.49  8.23  16.7 
Denmark 61.43  14.37 32.17 41.92 53.32 66.85 83.23  7.57  37.45 
Finland 24.33  12.4  28.58 38.87 51.14 66.02 84.45  7.68  20.83 
France 101.62  16.12 35.11 45.25 57.03 70.93 87.65  7.97  5.92 
Germany 121.86  15.06 32.38 41.49 51.96 64.17 78.66  7.15 3.02 
Greece 14.36  14.4  35.69 49.51 66.38 87.38 114.1  10.37  29.16 
Hungary 123.65  14.84 31.76 40.74 51.14 63.36 78  7.09  48.06 
Italy 61.95  14.63 34.14 46.06 60.31 77.67 99.28  9.03  7.49 
Lithuania  56.84  6.16 20.72 34.4 51.55 73.47 102.16 9.29  91.35 
Netherlands 29.72  16.62 36.51 46.73 58.61 72.63 89.48  8.13  10.07 
Portugal 165.78  12.72 33.2  48.07 66.45 89.64 119.55 10.87  7.08 
Slovakia 74.98  16.78 37.92 50.34 65.02 82.67 104.27 9.48  65.4 
Spain 76.84  16.72 37.68 49.53 63.51 80.27 100.74 9.16  18.29 
Sweden 14.36  15.17 33.62 44.11 56.35 70.88 88.43  8.04  21.69 
United Kingdom  78.18  15.12 33.69 44.14 56.44 71.15 89.09  8.1  6.95  
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